I do not take anything you say seriously. You post about Mugabe reversing the gains in Zimbabwe in the 90s but never once mentioned the IMF policies. Many countries including Trinidad did not understand the hardship and negative consequences of the IMF policies until experiencing them. Many countries learnt those lessons the hard way. Of course all leaders were blamed for that. But Mugabe was one of the leaders to dump the IMF.

Several times I have stated on this board that African nations needed to trade more with other African nations, notwithstanding costs etc. You are repeating this statement to this post as if it was something original that you recognized.

I think you are fishing, and have no idea what amounts to good governance because your character desires elitism. (You can revisit our first reasoning for a clear example of this.)

http://www.rastafarispeaks.com/cgi-bin/forum/archive1/config.pl?read=41580

You present no facts so I would post some more that you can try to spin.

[quote]

In the name of 'defending democracy', members of the international community have interfered extensively in Zimbabwe's affairs in recent years.

-- Since November 1998, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has implemented undeclared sanctions by warning off potential investors, freezing loans and refusing negotiations on debt.

-- In September 1999, the IMF suspended its support for economic adjustment and reform in Zimbabwe.

-- In October 1999, the International Development Association (IDA, a multilateral development bank) suspended all structural adjustment loans, credits, and guarantees to Zimbabwe's government.

-- In May 2000, the IDA suspended all other new lending to the government.

-- In September 2000, the IDA suspended disbursement of funds for ongoing projects under previously approved loans, credits, and guarantees.

-- In April 2000, the Zimbabwe Democracy Trust was established by mainly white Zimbabwean commercial figures, British ex-foreign ministers and former US assistant secretary of state for Africa, Chester Crocker. The trust's stated objectives are 'to help the democratic will of the people flourish' (1) - but several of its patrons have substantial commercial interests in Zimbabwe. Crocker is a director of Ashanti Goldfields which owns Zimbabwe's largest gold mine, and Sir John Collins, the driving force behind the trust, is the Zimbabwean chairman of National Power, a British company with a US$1.5 billion contract to develop a power station in the country.

http://www.spiked-online.com/Printable/00000002D428.htm

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Other pertinent information that you never presented were:

They claim the shortage of food in Zimbabwe is due to the farm seizures; however this is not the entire story. Many regions in Africa, including Zimbabwe, were experiencing a drought, and that was also responsible for low food production. Most of the White farmers in Zimbabwe grew tobacco while peasant farmers grow about 70% of the maize used in Zimbabwe.

[quote]

"Much of Zimbabwe's most fertile land is used to grow not necessities for the hungry, but luxuries for the sated: mange tout, radicchio, french beans and tobacco."

http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4010002,00.html

[end quote]

and,

[quote]

When Zimbabwe had a Model Economy

There was a time when the management of the economy in Zimbabwe was highly regarded in Western circles. Throughout its first decade of independence, Zimbabwe's economy grew at an average of 4 percent per year, and substantial gains were made in education and health. Zimbabwe was handling its finances well, and between 1985 and 1989 had cut its debt-service ratio in half. (6) However, the demise of socialism in Europe resulted in an inhospitable environment for nations charting an independent course, and Zimbabwe felt compelled by Western demands to liberalize its economy. In January 1991, Zimbabwe adopted its Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), designed primarily by the World Bank. The program called for the usual prescription of actions advocated by Western financial institutions, including privatization, deregulation, a reduction of government expenditures on social needs, and deficit cutting. User fees were instituted for health and education, and food subsidies were eliminated. Measures protecting local industry from foreign competition were also withdrawn.

The impact was immediate. While pleasing for Western investors, the result was a disaster for the people of Zimbabwe. According to one study, the poorest households in Harare saw their income drop over 12 percent in the year from 1991 to 1992 alone, while real wages in the country plunged by a third over the life of the program. Falling income levels forced people to spend a greater percentage of their income on food, and second-hand clothes were imported to compensate for the inability of most of Zimbabwe's citizens to purchase new clothing. A 1994 survey in Harare found that 90 percent of those interviewed felt that ESAP had adversely affected their lives. The rise in food prices was seen as a major problem by 64 percent of respondents, while many indicated that they were forced to reduce their food intake. ESAP resulted in mass layoffs and crippled the job market so that many were unable to find any employment at all. In the communal areas, the rise in fertilizer prices meant that subsistence farmers were no longer able to fertilize their land, resulting in lower yields. ESAP also mandated the elimination of price controls, allowing those shop owners in communal area who were free of competition to mark prices up dramatically. In 1995, the IMF cut funding to the program when it felt that Zimbabwe wasn't cutting its budget and laying off civil service employees fast enough. Furthermore, the IMF complained, the pace of privatization wasn't rapid enough. But implementation of ESAP was quite fast enough for the people of Zimbabwe. By 1995, over one third of Zimbabwe's citizens could not afford a basic food basket, shelter and clothing. From 1991 to 1995, Zimbabwe experienced a sharp deindustrialization, as manufacturing output fell 40 percent. (7) According to an economic writer from the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), "There is a general consensus among the people of Zimbabwe that ESAP has driven many families into poverty. The program only benefited a privileged minority at the expense of the underprivileged majority." (8) As intended by Western financial institutions, one could argue.

Ditching ESAP

The government of Zimbabwe felt it could no longer endure this debacle, and by the end of the 1990's, started moving away from the neoliberal program. Finally, in October 2001, the abandonment of ESAP was officially announced. "Enough is enough," declared President Mugabe. "ESAP is no more." A press release issued by the governing ZANU-PF declared, "The termination of ESAP brings to an end the era of control of our economy by the IMF and the World Bank. While we must continue to work with these organizations on agreed projects, they will no longer dictate the direction of policy and the country." Price controls were implemented for basic commodities that soaring prices had made all but unattainable for many poor Zimbabweans, including bread, maize meal, flour, sugar, cooking oil, beef, chicken, pork, milk, soap and generic drugs. To counter the threat of companies closing in protest against price controls, President Mugabe announced, "The State will take over any businesses that are closed. We will reorganize them with workers, and at last that socialism we wanted can start again." Mugabe dismissed claims that government should not interfere with the market as "absolute nonsense," and stated that the nearly hourly price increases for goods and commodities had been unjustified. (9) The 1997 launch of a new phase in the land reform program, in which 1,471 farms were listed for compulsory purchase, triggered British intervention in Zimbabwe. The jettisoning of ESAP four years later, coupled with the statement that sectors of the economy would be placed on a socialist path, only increased the sense of outrage among Western leaders.

The establishment of a new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), in September 1999, found instant support from Western leaders. Significant funding from Western sources enabled the party to rapidly grow to the point where it won 57 out of 120 seats in the June 24-25 2000 parliamentary election, less than one year after its creation. Ostensibly based in the labor movement, the program of MDC reads like a call for a return to ESAP. A policy paper issued by the party spelled out its plans for privatization. Upon taking power, the party plans to appoint a "fund manager to dispose of government-owned shares in publicly quoted companies." The boards of all public enterprises would be "reconstituted," and the new boards would be "required to privatize their enterprises within specified timetables...with an overall target of privatizing all designated parastatals [public companies] within two years." The interests of Western capital would not be ignored. "In areas where a high level of technical skill is required, foreign strategic investors will be encouraged to bid for a majority stake in the enterprises being privatized." A primary principle of the program would be that "all sales of major state assets will be conducted through open, international [that is, Western], competitive bidding." In order to counter opposition from workers made redundant, the National Privatization and Procurement Agency would be instructed to "carry out public awareness campaigns regarding the privatization program in order to generate public awareness and support for the exercise." Implementation of its program, the MDC feels, will mean "that foreign direct investment will take place on a substantial scale." (10) As a further incentive for Western investors, the MDC plans to review income and corporate tax levels "for regional competitiveness." (11)

http://www.swans.com/library/art8/elich004.html

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